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ABSTRACT
This article discusses how an analogy between 
algorithms and bureaucratic decision-making 
could help conceptualize error management 
in algorithmic systems. It argues that a view of 
algorithms as irreflexive bureaucratic processes 
is insufficient as an account of errors in complex 
public sector contexts, where algorithms 
operate jointly with other organizational work 
practices. To conceptualize such contexts, the 
article proposes that algorithms could be viewed 
as analogous to work routines in bureaucratic 
organizations. Doing so helps clarify that 
algorithmic irreflexivity becomes problematic 
when the coordination of routine work around 
automation fails. Thus, also the challenges of 
error management come to concern the wider 
context of organized work. This argument is 
illustrated using known examples from the 
critical literature on algorithms. Finally, drawing 
on recent studies in routine dynamics, the 
article formulates empirical research directions 
on error management in algorithmic systems.
Keywords: Automated decision-making; decision-
making errors; irreflexivity; bureaucracy; 
routine dynamics
INTRODUCTION
Recent discussions of automated decision-
making have drawn on literature in 
organizational and administrative studies 
to analyze the role and shortcomings of 
algorithms. Rule-based algorithms in public 
administration have been likened to the 
strictly circumscribed decision processes of 
classical bureaucracies, which cannot deal 
with heterogeneous, ambiguous, or frequently 
shifting decision-making circumstances 
(Autioniemi 2020). Similarly to bureaucratic 
processes, algorithms have been argued to 
constitute irreflexive mechanisms for decision-
making, in that at the time of their execution, 
they cannot accommodate unanticipated or 
situation-dependent information about the 
processed cases (see Alkhatib & Bernstein 2019). 
While new techniques such as machine learning 
promise efficient data-driven recommendations 
in increasingly complex contexts, scholars 
have argued that even sophisticated modeling 
approaches can be blind to important situational 
nuances that bear upon the decisions (e.g. 
Salovaara et al. 2019). In the critical literature, 
the underlying worry is that the automation of 
decision-making through irreflexive algorithms 
can lead to unfair or otherwise erroneous results 
in complex settings –  such as criminal justice 
(Angwin et al. 2016), child welfare protection 
(Eubanks 2018), or medical care (Obermeyer 
et al. 2019) – where decisions have traditionally 
relied on the discretionary evaluation of human 
officials.
In this article, I discuss this proposed analogy 
between algorithms and bureaucratic decision 
processes to articulate how it could help us 
understand the errors of automated decision-
making. More specifically, I will address the 
following research question: How could the 
view of algorithms as irreflexive processes help us 
conceptualize and empirically investigate decision-
making errors in settings where algorithms operate 
jointly with other organizational work practices? 
I use the term “algorithm” to encompass both 
the relatively simple rule-governed mechanisms 
used to automate tasks in highly regulated 
contexts such as tax administration, as well as 
the more sophisticated statistical approaches to 
data modeling that typically underlie artificial 
intelligence applications (cf. Autioniemi 2020). 
By “errors”, I mean any results of decision 
processes, which are unintentionally unfair, 
systematically biased, or inconsistent with the 
aims of decision-making. Examples of such 
adverse outcomes abound in the literature on 
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algorithms, but a systematic understanding of 
how they emerge in relation to wider contexts 
of organizational action has yet to be articulated. 
The aim of this article is to formulate an initial 
conceptualization for such an account.
To do so, I will argue that while the view of 
algorithms as irreflexive decision processes akin 
to classical bureaucracy provides an intuitive 
explanation for the errors of automation, 
it does not suffice to shed light on cases 
where algorithms interoperate with other 
organizational work practices. In such cases, a 
study of how the potential errors of automation 
are managed – that is, understood, recognized, 
and dealt with – as part of organizational 
action is crucial for understanding how they 
might come about. It is this process of error 
management, and in particular its challenges, 
that I seek to conceptualize through further 
discussing the analogy between bureaucracies 
and algorithmic systems.
To answer my research question, I propose 
that algorithms could be considered as 
analogous to work routines in bureaucratic 
organizations (e.g. Crozier 1964; Lipsky 1980). 
I intend this analogy to have both a positive 
and a negative side. Positively, the analogy 
retains that algorithms are similar to strictly 
circumscribed work patterns in bureaucratic 
organizations – bureaucratic routines – in 
that they constitute extremely formalized and 
irreflexive mechanisms for decision-making. 
However, on the negative side, algorithms bear 
important differences in relation to other work 
routines, as they have been characterized in 
recent organizational studies literature. Most 
importantly, routines have been argued to be 
dynamic in nature, in the sense that they can 
evolve to accommodate unanticipated or shifting 
circumstances of action (Feldman & Pentland 
2003). By contrast, and similarly to bureaucratic 
routines, algorithms can be difficult to adapt to 
varying organizational practices, which can lead 
to inconsistent outputs and failures to identify 
unfair decisions.
Building on this perspective, I will argue that 
algorithmic irreflexivity becomes problematic 
in organizational decision-making when the 
coordination of routine performances around 
automation fails. Furthermore, I will propose 
that the literature on routine dynamics provides 
a fruitful starting point for investigating these 
challenges (e.g. Berente et al. 2016; Glaser et 
al. 2021; Kremser & Schreyögg 2016). As such, 
the view of algorithms as bureaucratic routines 
helps reformulate criticisms of algorithmic 
irreflexivity into interesting empirical questions 
about work processes in technological systems. 
The delineation of these research questions is the 
primary contribution of this article.
My discussion will proceed as follows. In 
the next section, I will introduce the view of 
algorithms as irreflexive bureaucratic processes 
and argue that it does not suffice to explain 
errors in cases where algorithms operate jointly 
with other organizational practices. Thus, error 
management as an organizational process 
needs to be considered. To illustrate this point, 
I discuss more closely a case documented 
by Eubanks (2018), where decision-making 
errors result from a host of routine practices 
operating jointly with automated processes. I 
will then argue that the view of algorithms as 
bureaucratic routines can help us conceptualize 
such interrelations, and to ground an approach 
to empirically studying error management. 
Finally, I conclude with some thoughts on the 
relevance of understanding error management 
for the ethical and societal debates about 
automated decision-making.
ALGORITHMIC IRREFLEXIVITY  
AND THE ERRORS OF AUTOMATED  
DECISION-MAKING
Critical scholars of algorithms have demon-
strated case after another how the automation 
of decision-making can lead to adverse 
consequences. For instance, risk prediction 
systems that draw on data about past cases have 
been shown to exhibit biases across a number 
of contexts. As a recent example, Obermeyer et 
al. (2019) showed that a widely used algorithm 
for assessing patient need for medical care was 
racially biased, because its predictions used 
earlier treatment expenses as a proxy measure 
for the risk of future illness, which led to 
prioritizing wealthy clients over the poor. On the 
other hand, algorithms that rely on predesigned 
classifications or standardized rules for sorting 
out people have been shown to oversimplify 
heterogeneous real-world situations. A recent 
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case is the dysfunctional COVID-19 vaccine 
distribution algorithm at the Stanford Medical 
Centre – a simple rule-based decision-process, 
which was found to prioritize high ranking 
doctors over patient facing workers, because the 
algorithm was not designed to factor in the time 
that workers actually spend facing patients who 
carry the disease (Guo & Hao 2020).
Technical literature has variously traced the 
roots of such algorithmic errors to biased patterns 
in training data, or to poorly understood decision 
functions with unintended consequences (e.g. 
Christian 2020). Around these issues, a vast 
body of work has developed that analyzes 
notions such as fairness and accountability to 
map design directions for algorithms in the 
public sector and beyond (e.g. Diakopoulos 
2016; Friedler et al. 2021). However, in addition 
to these studies, scholars have recently started 
to explore how the longstanding literature on 
earlier decision-making mechanisms could be 
applied to inform the design and evaluation of 
algorithmic systems. These works argue that 
important insights could be learned by viewing 
algorithms as analogous to more traditional 
bureaucratic decision processes (Alkhatib & 
Bernstein 2019; Autioniemi 2020; Alkhatib 
2021; Pääkkönen et al. 2020).
The starting point of this approach is that 
algorithms are rigorously prespecified sets 
of rules for information processing, which 
at the time of execution cannot take into 
account unanticipated or situation-dependent 
information that might be relevant for decisions 
(e.g. Alkhatib & Bernstein 2019; Autioniemi 
2020). This irreflexivity of algorithms becomes 
especially problematic in complex public sector 
contexts, where the discretionary evaluation of 
particular cases has traditionally formed the 
foundation for policy application (Alkhatib 
& Bernstein 2019). Decision-making tasks 
in the public sector are complex in the sense 
that abstract policy principles and regulations 
typically cannot be straightforwardly applied 
to particular cases, due to case heterogeneity 
and ambiguities in rule application with respect 
to concrete situations. Past studies of public 
sector decision-making have shown that this 
“gap” between abstract principles and their 
application is bridged in practice by human 
“street-level bureaucrats” (Lipsky 1980) – such as 
social workers, police officers, or judges – who 
are capable of reflexive assessment of particular 
cases and practices such as responsive listening 
(Stivers 1994). The argument from irreflexivity 
is that, unlike human officials, algorithms 
must operate according to fixed procedures 
and prespecified classifications that might only 
poorly capture the nuanced aspects of people’s 
lives. At best, the operation of algorithms can 
be corrected after decisions, if information 
about their errors becomes available. Due to 
irreflexivity, Autioniemi (2020) has argued that 
rule-based artificial intelligence applications 
in public administration should be primarily 
limited to routine tasks, where decisions follow 
from unambiguous criteria (see also Mehr 
2017). For the same reason, Alkhatib (2021) 
argues that machine learning applications with 
implications for large numbers of people should 
be abandoned, because their potential for 
adverse consequences is high.
This view of algorithms as irreflexive decision 
processes provides an intuitive explanation for 
the errors of automation. For instance, the racial 
biases of risk prediction in medical care can be 
understood by appeal to the fact that algorithms 
trained to infer illness risks solely on the basis 
of patients’ past medical expenses cannot take 
into account information about inequalities 
in access to care. Accommodating this further 
information would require retraining the 
algorithms – which in fact is what happened 
in this case, after researchers had uncovered 
systematic bias in the model’s predictions 
(Obermeyer et al. 2019). Nevertheless, the point 
is that capturing the nuances of real-world 
situations in relatively simple sets of decision 
rules or predictive models is difficult, and at the 
time of execution algorithms are not capable 
of reflecting on the shortcomings of their 
prespecified decision criteria. Consequently, 
Alkhatib and Bernstein (2019, 7–8) argue that 
considerations of irreflexivity should impel 
designers to focus their efforts on building 
mechanisms for post hoc error rectification 
 – such as tolerably accessible channels for 
recourse  – instead of technical fixes that seek to 
avoid errors before they happen.
However, although the idea of irreflexivity 
helps pinpoint how even sophisticated 
algorithms might introduce a source of error 
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into decision-making, the view says little of how 
these errors become implicated in wider contexts 
of organizational action. Past research has shown 
that algorithms rarely operate in isolation, often 
being used as systems for supporting rather than 
automating decisions (e.g. Saunders-Newton 
& Scott 2001; Christin 2017). Even in cases 
where important organizational processes are 
delegated to algorithms, research has shown 
that the implications of automation cannot be 
adequately understood without analyzing wider 
organizational circumstances (Shestakofsky 
2017). Indeed, recent work on digital organizing 
has emphasized the importance of developing 
reliable practices for recognizing and correcting 
the errors of irreflexive automation (Salovaara 
et al. 2019; Asatiani et al. 2021). What these 
studies indicate is that in settings where 
decision-making involves organized action over 
and above automated information processing, 
the irreflexivity of algorithms alone is an 
insufficient analysis of errors. Rather, in such 
cases, an account of errors should be able to 
explain how attempts to recognize and correct 
the shortcomings of automation might fail, and 
what challenges are involved in developing 
mechanisms for error management.
In what follows, I will propose that viewing 
algorithms as analogous to bureaucratic routines 
offers a promising approach to conceptualizing 
such challenges in algorithmic systems. The next 
section illustrates these challenges by examining 
a case, where erroneous decisions were a result 
of diverse organizational practices operating in 
association with algorithms.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE: AUTOMATED 
HOUSING ALLOCATION
In her book Automating Inequality (2018), 
Virginia Eubanks investigates a system for 
automating homeless services deployed in Los 
Angeles in 2011. The stated motives behind 
automation in this case were to improve service 
efficiency and to ground the housing admission 
process on assessment of real need. Previously, 
homeless services in Los Angeles had relied on a 
complicated system of street-level agencies with 
long waiting queues, insufficient resources, and 
inconsistent practices for evaluating applicants. 
The new system was eventually deployed in 
response to escalating numbers of people 
living on the street, with a focus on providing 
permanent housing for the chronically homeless 
 – a group identified as having more complex 
social support needs and higher risk of health 
problems than the other unhoused. (Eubanks 
2018, 91–93; see also https://www.lahsa.org/ces/
about.)
As documented by Eubanks, the automated 
system builds on two algorithms, which draw 
on data from survey interviews with housing 
applicants to pair them with appropriate 
housing. The first algorithm is a ranking system, 
which calculates a risk score for the applicants 
based on their survey answers. Depending on 
the score, the applicant is allocated into one 
of three “triage” classes, which correspond to 
different levels of housing need (see Karusala 
et al. 2019 for extensive discussion of triage 
tools in homeless services). Low scores indicate 
no need for housing intervention, while higher 
scores indicate either the need for some limited 
term supportive services and rental subsidies, 
or permanent housing. The risk scores are then 
used as input for a second algorithm, a matching 
procedure, which pairs high-scoring applicants 
with available free apartments that best suit their 
needs in terms of prespecified eligibility criteria. 
(Eubanks 2018, 93–95.)
The system aspires for extensive standardiza-
tion of the housing admission process, on the 
basis of prespecified criteria for evaluating 
the applicants’ situation. These criteria are 
operationalized by the survey questionnaire, 
which includes questions about, for example, 
the applicants’ use of emergency health care 
services during the past months, and the 
frequency of activities such as drug abuse or 
violent behavior (Eubanks 2018, 93–94). Each 
of these items corresponds to a pre-assigned 
score in automated evaluation, which produces 
the risk score for the applicant.
However, Eubanks’s investigation revealed 
that housing need evaluation could not be as 
straightforwardly standardized as presupposed 
in the system’s design. For instance, the various 
agencies responsible for organizing the actual 
surveys had different practices for interviewing 
applicants. Some interviews were administered 
under formal circumstances, while others 
were conducted in overnight shelters, where 
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the applicants already knew the staff and were 
more willing to disclose sensitive information 
(Eubanks 2018, 95–103, 105–107). As a result, 
the same applicant could receive low scores 
in some agencies and high scores in others. In 
addition to these inconsistent data collection 
practices, Eubanks (2018, 103–109) describes 
how the interpretation of risk scores varied 
across city areas. In some areas, a high score 
more or less meant that the applicant was 
handed keys to an apartment. In others, high 
scores were interpreted as implying that the 
applicant is incapable of maintaining an 
independent life, and thus cannot be granted 
housing. (Eubanks 2018, 107.) The prevalent 
practice in certain areas was to grant high-
scoring applicants vouchers for renting an 
apartment on the private real estate market. 
However, as many house owners were reluctant 
to rent their apartments to homeless applicants, 
vouchers were no guarantee that applicants 
could actually secure housing, despite scoring 
high in the system. (Eubanks 2018, 108.)
These observations are corroborated by the 
study of data collection practices in Los Angeles 
homeless services by Karusala et al. (2019). 
The authors interviewed a number of case 
workers and found them to be acutely aware of 
the “subjectivities behind the triage tools” that 
deal with sensitive information about people 
in vulnerable positions (Karusala et al. 2019, 
8). The case workers noted that the accuracy 
of survey scores is “actually dependent on 
building rapport” between the interviewer and 
the interviewee, and that this trust-building 
process can only happen gradually over time 
(Karusala et al. 2019, 8). Indeed, as Eubanks 
(2018, 94) notes, the data gathered in the system 
is shared with 168 different organizations, 
including police and government authorities. 
This makes disclosing scoring-relevant sensitive 
information difficult for some applicants, who 
might worry about potential complications with 
authorities, and highlights the importance of 
trust for accurate data collection (Eubanks 2018, 
121). Thus, the risk scores were sensitive to 
variance in data collection practices, which was 
also reflected in the case workers’ perceptions 
of scoring validity. Karusala et al. (2019, 16) 
describe how some workers took the scores as 
ground-truth evidence of housing need, while 
others questioned their validity on the basis of 
intimate knowledge of the applicants’ situations. 
Overcoming such tensions involved persuasive 
work and negotiations over case details, to 
determine how difficult cases should be decided, 
and how the validity of the automated scorings 
should be assessed (Karusala et al. 2019, 17–18).
These examples show that the correctness 
of housing admission decisions in this case 
depended on diverse work practices and 
decision-making routines in addition to the 
automated processes for scoring and matching 
applicants. The automated scorings were based 
on prespecified criteria for determining housing 
need. These criteria can of course themselves be 
criticized, and Eubanks (2018) in fact argues that 
the system’s focus on the chronically homeless 
complicates access to housing for large groups 
of unhoused people. Thus, the automated 
system can be argued to be irreflexive in the 
sense that its criteria fail to accommodate cases 
where there would be real need for housing. 
This is an example of case complexity in public 
services complicating the design of algorithmic 
decision-making systems. However, even if 
the prespecified scoring criteria were accepted 
as appropriately reflecting housing need, the 
system still produced inconsistent results and 
negative admission decisions for applicants who 
by its own criteria should have been eligible 
for support. These decision-making failings 
cannot be accounted for solely by appeal to the 
irreflexivity of the automated processes. Rather, 
the errors resulted from associations between 
varying organizational work practices and 
irreflexive automated processes, which were 
jointly responsible for the decisions.
ALGORITHMS AS BUREAUCRATIC 
ROUTINES
Literature on organizational decision-making 
has long emphasized the importance of 
routinized work. Routines are commonly 
defined as repetitive and recognizable patterns 
of interdependent actions carried out by 
multiple actors (Feldman & Pentland 2003). 
Such patterns of action have been discussed 
as the standard mechanism for managing 
work in organizations. Routines have been 
argued to improve the stability, accountability 
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and efficiency of decision-making (Feldman 
& Pentland 2003, 94). However, they can also 
introduce simplifications into decision processes 
and be an important source of bias (Lipsky 
1980). At worst, overly strict routinization has 
been argued to lead to mindless adherence to 
rules (Ashforth & Fried 1988) and inflexible 
practices which prevent bureaucratic organiza-
tions from recognizing and correcting dys-
functional procedures (Crozier 1964; Weiss & 
Ilgen 1985). For this reason, Lipsky (1980, 84) 
argued that an analysis of routine work is crucial 
for understanding the shortcomings of public 
sector decision-making, where the “policies that 
result from routine treatment are often biased in 
ways unintended by the agencies whose policies 
are being implemented”.
I will next argue that an analogy between 
strict routinization and algorithmic information 
processing provides a useful starting point for 
analyzing decision-making errors in algorithmic 
systems. On the positive side of this analogy, both 
algorithms and routines constitute mechanisms 
for organizing work tasks into repetitive and 
recognizable patterns. Ideally, both algorithms 
and routines improve the efficiency of decision-
making and facilitate impartiality, through 
minimizing the role of worker discretion 
in task completion (see Bovens & Zouridis 
2002). However, as Glaser et al. (2021) argue, 
algorithms also formalize task sequences in 
a manner that is much more rigid than many 
earlier mechanisms for managing work, such as 
written task instructions. As such, algorithms 
share particular likeness with routinized work 
in bureaucratic organizations, which seek to 
control worker behavior through extensively 
standardized rules and role descriptions 
(see Kellogg et al. 2020). Accordingly, both 
algorithms and bureaucratic routines have been 
argued to constitute “mindless” processes (see 
Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1984 for discussion of the 
mindlessness metaphor in artificial intelligence 
research), which can lead to errors in complex 
circumstances. 
It is in this sense that algorithms – conceived 
as analogous to strict bureaucratic routines 
– can be argued to be importantly different 
from other kinds of routinized work. Although 
the traditional understanding of routines 
conceptualized them as a source of stability 
and organizational inertia, more recent studies 
have emphasized that routines are dynamically 
evolving patterns of action which necessarily 
involve a performative aspect (D’Adderio 2008). 
Routines must be performed through “specific 
actions, by specific people, at specific times and 
places” (Feldman & Pentland 2003, 94), and have 
been found to change in interaction with each 
other and in response to shifting circumstances 
of action (Kremser & Schreyögg 2016; Berente 
et al. 2016). This means that the performance 
of routines can involve considerable variety, 
which over time can also induce changes in the 
abstract understanding or description of the task 
sequence itself (Feldman & Pentland 2003, 112–
114). In other words, routinized work crucially 
involves an element of discretionary assessment, 
which makes routines to a certain extent capable 
of adapting to idiosyncratic circumstances 
not captured in their abstract description. 
This performative aspect enables routines to 
simultaneously improve work efficiency, while 
allowing low-level workers to creatively manage 
exceptional situations and contingencies in task 
execution (Berente et al. 2016; Crozier 1964; 
Perrow 1967).
By contrast – as the criticism from irreflexivity 
has it – algorithms cannot at the time of execution 
adapt to unexpected circumstances or changes 
in surrounding work practices (Alkhatib & 
Bernstein 2019). As Autioniemi (2020) argues, 
this lack of situational adaptivity might not 
be problematic when algorithms are used to 
automate simple and rigorously specified task 
sequences. However, as we saw in the previous 
section, in public sector decision-making 
algorithms are often deployed in conjunction 
with other routine processes, which might vary 
in performance and be subject to change over 
time. Consequently, the automated processes 
that draw on varying routine performances will 
yield inconsistent outputs, which moreover are 
used in conflicting ways in other parts of the 
system.
The case of homeless service automation 
illustrates these difficulties well. In this case, 
the standardized survey can be thought of as a 
routine process, where multiple actors perform 
prespecified tasks sequences to produce data 
for automated risk scoring. The standardized 
questionnaire embodies an abstract prescription 
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for how data collection should be accomplished, 
which however was variously performed in 
different agencies. Due to this variance, the 
automated scorings could only superficially 
be treated as comparable to each other, as in 
reality they more closely reflected differences 
across routine performances. Furthermore, the 
outputs of the automated system were used as 
grounds for decision-making downstream, in 
housing admission routines which also differed 
from each other at crucial points. Importantly, 
while the data collection routine could have 
been rigidly enough standardized, the system’s 
overall decisions would still have remained 
inconsistent and in some cases contradictory 
to the prespecified triage classification, given 
that scorings were differently interpreted and 
deployed across city areas. The underlying 
problem is that the design of the automated 
system could not take into account variance in 
the routine performances associated with its 
operation.
Thus, by explicitly considering the 
similarities and differences between algorithms 
and routinized work, we can see that in 
organizational contexts algorithmic irreflexivity 
is not only problematic because automation 
might simplify nuanced real-world situations. 
Rather, the issue of irreflexivity also comes 
to concern the challenge of coordinating 
varying routine performances in relation to 
the automated processes. To understand how 
erroneous decisions come about, we need to 
investigate the difficulties involved in achieving 
this coordination.  Algorithmic irreflexivity 
certainly is a source of error in organizational 
contexts, but an account of how these errors 
become implicated in decision-making should 
also shed light on how attempts to deal with 
them fail. This is what the literature on routine 
dynamics can help conceptualize and study in a 
systematic fashion.
Building on the performative view of 
routines, Kremser and Schreyögg (2016) argue 
that organizations tend to develop clusters of 
interrelated but semi-autonomous routines, 
which adapt over time to each other and to the 
specific circumstances of their respective tasks. 
The advantage of developing such “well oiled” 
systems of routines is that they enable efficient 
coordination of even very complicated tasks. 
Within a cluster, single routines are autonomous 
in the sense that their performers need not know 
how work elsewhere is carried out, as long as 
they are able to adapt their own performances 
in relation to the circumstances of their focal 
domain. (Kremser & Schreyögg 2016, 700–702.) 
However, this also means that information 
exchange between routines becomes limited, 
and clusters become incapable of adapting to 
changes outside their particular focus (Kremser 
& Schreyögg 2016, 715). This limited possibility 
of coordinating interrelated but autonomously 
operating routines can also become a hindrance 
for error management in algorithmic systems.
Consider again the case of homeless service 
automation, where such locking of routines 
seems to be at play. As Karusala et al. (2019, 17) 
describe, case workers in different positions 
experienced difficulties in explaining their 
understandings of the scorings to each other. For 
instance, the data collectors’ intimate knowledge 
about applicant situations could not be easily 
transferred to workers in housing admission. 
However, addressing inconsistencies would 
require that the divergent routine performances 
be coordinated with respect to each other. To 
some extent, this can happen through street-
level practices such as case conferences, where 
workers negotiate difficult-to-decide cases and 
the appropriate interpretation of risk scores 
(Karusala et al. 2019, 3). However, as Eubanks 
(2018, 107–112) argues, more throrough efforts 
at alignment – for instance across city areas – 
are likely to require top-down intervention and 
extensive resource investments. Given that the 
diverging routines at play might be adapted to 
handle quite specific circumstances, achieving 
effective coordination might be difficult without 
also bringing about unexpected consequences. 
Indeed, a central characteristic of established 
routine clusters is that they resist change 
(Kremser & Schreyögg 2016, 715–716), and 
this can also complicate error rectification in 
algorithmic systems.
A related challenge due to routinized work 
is that identifying erroneous decisions might 
be difficult, because it might not be clear what 
constitutes result correctness in the first place. 
As the studies of Eubanks (2018) and Karusala et 
al. (2019) show, the criteria for decision-making 
correctness can vary across routines. This is 
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again evidenced by the diverging status ascribed 
to the triage scorings. Some data collectors 
challenged the scorings on the basis of intimate 
familiarity with applicant situations, while 
others regarded them as ground truth (Karusala 
et al. 2019, 16). Arguably, this is because 
workers in other positions could not “see” into 
the contingencies involved in case evaluation. 
From the perspective of error management, 
the problem is to decide how the correctness 
of decisions should be assessed, given such 
conflicting street-level judgments of the 
system’s functioning. Potential reconfigurations 
of algorithms must resolve tensions between 
such conflicting approaches, which make the 
objective measurement of errors difficult.
ERROR MANAGEMENT IN ALGORITHMIC 
SYSTEMS: DIRECTIONS FOR EMPIRICAL 
RESEARCH
In the previous sections I have argued that the 
view of algorithms as analogous to bureaucratic 
routines could help us conceptualize the 
challenges of error management in algorithmic 
systems. The primary import of this 
conceptualization is that it offers promising 
starting points for empirical research on error 
management. One interesting issue concerns 
how algorithms are used to automate action in 
organizations, and the implications of this for 
error management. Glaser et al. (2021) have 
argued that algorithms can relate to other work 
routines through 1) automating parts of their 
action sequences, 2) establishing entirely novel 
sequences of action that other routines may 
or may not be associated with, or 3) through 
influencing how routines relate to each other. 
In each case, irreflexivity might have different 
implications for how decision-making errors 
can be detected and addressed. This calls 
for empirical work on the different uses of 
algorithms, with potential for comparisons 
between error management challenges and 
strategies across the uses. For instance, are there 
systematic differences in how decision-making 
correctness is understood and measured across 
the various uses of algorithms? Are errors 
handled as part of routine operations, or through 
discretionary adaptation? Previous studies 
have argued that automation might shift the 
location of discretionary work in organizations 
(Pääkkönen et al. 2020). The focus on work 
routines could help investigate these changes in 
a systematic fashion.
A related issue concerns how performative 
variance in routines becomes problematic for 
irreflexive algorithms. Berente et al. (2016) 
have argued that dynamically adapting routines 
provide an important source of stability in 
organizations, in that they can adjust to 
accommodate for the potential dysfunctions of 
technological reforms. Somewhat paradoxically, 
this stability is not achieved by rigidly aligning 
routines to match information system design, 
but rather by allowing routines to develop 
their own performative adaptations (Berente 
et al. 2016, 564–567). However, in the case 
of homeless service automation we saw that 
too little standardization can lead to errors 
with irreflexive algorithms. This points to an 
interesting question: what determines when 
routine performances around algorithms 
should be rigidly coordinated, versus allowed to 
vary? The sociological theory of technological 
accidents (Perrow 1999) predicts that when 
technological processes are fairly simple but 
tightly connected to each other – in the sense 
that human intervention in their execution is 
limited – work around those processes should 
be highly standardized. A promising avenue for 
research would be to investigate whether this 
holds also for decision-making automation in 
public sector organizations.
The routine dynamics literature also 
provides further hypotheses for investigating 
the conditions under which irreflexivity can 
become challenging. Kremser and Schreyögg 
(2016, 718) note that the extent to which 
routines tend to form stable clusters depends 
on their relative centrality to the organizations’ 
core tasks, as well as on the age of the routines in 
question. Thus, a reasonable expectation would 
be that in such locations of tight clustering, 
the error potential of automation is increased, 
given that established clusters might not adapt 
well to top-down interventions and changes. 
On the other hand, recognizing the errors of 
algorithms might be easier in such situations, if 
the established clusters involve highly aligned 
criteria for decision correctness. Investigation 
of these issues could be combined with the 
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notion that algorithms can relate differently 
to extant routines, to form a typology of error 
management challenges. For instance, is 
replacing parts of individual routines easier 
than establishing novel automated sequences 
in tightly adapted routine clusters, and what are 
the associated challenges?
Finally, the routine dynamics literature 
provides methodological recommendations for 
how to study work patterns around algorithms. 
Kremser and Schreyögg (2016, 716–717) 
argue that studies of evolving routines should 
preferably be longitudinal, and focus on tracing 
how work patterns react to changes in the 
technological environment. According to them, 
routine patterns can be distinguished from 
each other by investigating information flows 
between action sequences. Two sequences of 
action can be analyzed as separate routines, if 
there is no “exchange and processing of real-
time information” between the actors who 
perform them (Kremser & Schreyögg 2016, 716). 
A study of the interrelations between routines 
involves a reconstruction of routine clusters 
through investigating such information flows, 
and examining which routines use outputs from 
the others. This same approach could be applied 
to study work patterns that relate to automated 
processes, and how these evolve over time 
in association with algorithmic information 
processing.
CONCLUSION
In this article, I have argued that the analogy 
between algorithms and bureaucratic routines 
provides a useful starting point for conceptu-
alizing error management in algorithmic systems. 
Thoroughly demonstrating the usefulness of 
this view would require empirical studies on 
algorithms in organizational decision-making. 
Scholars of routine dynamics have begun to 
investigate these issues (Glaser et al. 2021), 
but the field’s focus on algorithmic systems 
is only now emerging. In particular, the focus 
has not been on error management in public 
sector automation. On the other hand, work 
practices that support reliable decision-making 
in technological systems have been discussed in 
the contexts of business and industry (Salovaara 
et al. 2019; Shestakofsky 2017), and in the 
extensive literature in Computer Supported 
Collaborative Work. Error management 
in public sector automation merits similar 
thorough investigation, and in this respect 
the account I propose signposts promising 
directions for empirical research.
In this regard, however, it should also be 
recognized that there are important ethical 
issues related to automated decision-making 
that my discussion has glossed over. For instance, 
as Mittelstadt et al. (2016, 12) note, the problem 
of how responsibility should be distributed in 
networks of human and algorithmic actors is 
a pressing one for automated decision-making. 
The worry is that the delegation of decision-
making to algorithms can lead to the “de-
responsibilisation of human actors”, and an 
associated tendency to assume that the results of 
sophisticated computational models are correct 
(Mittelstadt et al. 2016, 12–13). Recognizing that 
the debate on automated decision-making spans 
such ethical issues is doubly important for my 
argument, as these issues underscore the societal 
relevance of the topic of error management. 
Algorithmic technologies are becoming a 
standard tool in attempts to reorganize and 
streamline organizational processes, both in 
private industries and public services (see 
Kellogg et al. 2020). Previous literature on public 
sector decision-making and e-governance 
has argued that the increasing automation 
of public services and administration can 
compromise decision-making legitimacy and 
lead to the detachment of decision processes 
from the heterogeneous particularities of real-
life situations (Bovens & Zouridis 2002; Jansson 
& Erlingsson 2014; Smith et al. 2010). With 
the current hype about artificial intelligence in 
the public sector (e.g. Wirtz et al. 2019), issues 
such as accountability and the allocation of 
responsibilities in decision-making are only 
gaining traction. Systematic research on how 
algorithmic errors depend on the wider context 
of organized action might provide empirical 
grounds for informing these debates.
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